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Abstract 
The “low-hanging fruits” (LHF) (or cream-skimming) problem receives some attention in recent years. However, few 
studies provide formal analysis on the LHF problem and other flaws based on economic theory. This paper 
investigates the LHF problem of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM ) in China. The energy consumption and the 
Green House Gas (GHG) emission in China are outlined. The details of the CDM projects, including their distribution 
in China, and the types of projects are summarized. In order to test whether there were LHF problems in China, a 
simple statistical model is developed. The statistical analysis provides an indirect evidence that the LHF problem 
exists in China. The results indicate that areas with higher emission of GHG and low level of GDP per capita attract 
more CDM projects with higher amount of Certified Emission Reductions (CERs). The results are robust after 
eliminating HFC-23 decomposition projects from the sample. 
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1. Introduction 
The importance of international cooperation in reducing the Green House Gas (GHG) has been widely 
recognized. To date, the most substantial effort to address this problem is the Kyoto Protocol, the largest 
ever international effort to combat a g lobal environmental common problem. The Kyoto Protocol 
developed three mechanisms, one of which is the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). 
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The CDM is a so-called "flexibility mechanis m" designed to help countries with emission limitation 
commitments in the Kyoto Protocol to meet these commitments by undertaking activities in t he 
developing world  (CDM, Article 12; UN, 1997). However, there are a lot o f concerns about the operation 
of the CDM. Studies show that there are some inherent flaws. One example is the concern of developing 
counties for their future responsibilities. This  is know as the ‘low-hanging fruits’ (LHF) (or cream-
skimming) issue: the cheapest abatement measures will be implemented for CDM pro jects, leaving the 
developing countries with only more expensive measures when they have to meet their own commitments 
in the future[1]. The LHF problem receives some attention in recent years. However, few studies provide 
formal analysis on the LHF problem and other flaws based on economic theory. Exceptions include [1-4]. 
In general their conclusions are consistent: given the technology spillover, we do not have to worry  much 
about the LHF problem. To my knowledge, there are no empirical studies on the LHF problem of CDM 
and other mechanisms in Kyoto Protocol. 
In this study we provide case study of China. We develop a simple statistical model to test LHF 
problems in China. An empirical analysis provides indirect ev idence that there might be the LHF problem 
in China. 
2. The CDM projects in China 
The first CDM pro ject in China is the Huitengxile wind farm pro ject, which was registe red in 
UNFCCC in June 25th, 2005. By April 20th, 2008, according to the newest release from NCCCC of 
China, 197 CDM pro jects in China have been registered in UNFCCC, which account for 20% of all 
registered CDM project in the world. The CDM pro jects distribute unevenly in China. Provinces such as 
Jiangsu, Shandong and Neimenggu (Inner Mongolia) have both larger numbers of project and h igher 
amount of CERs. Provinces such as Gansu, who has the largest number of CDM pro jects (19 pro jects), 
shares only a small fract ion of CERs. Three provinces/directly governed cities have no CDM projects, 
namely Tibet, Shanghai and Tianjin. 
Noticeably, most projects in China are "big projects", with relat ively large expected amount of GHG 
reduction. The 197 CDM projects, with the estimated amount of Cert ified Emission Reductions (CERs) of 
106,957,509 metric ton of CO2 equivalent per year, account for 51% of expected world annual CERs. 
Obviously China has become the largest CDM market in the world.   
However, when we consider the amount of CERs, the "decomposition of GHG" type accounts for 54% , 
which is about 57.8 million metric ton of CO2 equivalent per year. All the 10 "decomposition of GHG"  
CDM projects in China are HFC-23 decomposition projects.  
HFC-23 (trifluoromethane), a  powerful greenhouse gas which is 11,700 times more potent as a 
greenhouse gas than CO2, is emitted while making the refrigerant HCFC-22 (ch lorodifluoromethane). 
The controversy centres on the inclusion of refrigerant-producing factories that generate the HFC 23 as a 
by-product. Crit ics of this practice say it is very wasteful to use the CDM to ensure destruction of HFC 23, 
when it would be far cheaper to simply g ive the factories the money to install the equipment to destroy 
the gas. It is estimated that it would cost only $100 million to pay producers to capture and destroy HFC 
23 compared with $6 billion in CDM credits  [5]. 
The fluorochemicals industry in China is very close to oligarch monopolization : the largest five firms 
account for over 80% of major fluorochemicals, such as HCFC-22 (The five firms  are: Shanghai SF 
co.Ltd., Zhejiang Juhua Co.Ltd,  Shandong Dongyue Co.Ltd, Jiangsu Meilan Co.Ltd and Zhonghao 
Chenguang Co. Ltd. China Industrial Statistics Yearbook 2006. ). Interestingly, 7 of the 10 HFC -23 
decomposition projects are hosted by these five firms, whose annual CERs is about 45,871,736 metric ton 
of CO2 equivalent, 43% of ALL CERs in  China. This can be seen as a d irect ev idence of the LHF 
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problem: the cheapest type of projects, which is HFC-23 decomposition, has been carved up quickly (The 
data above is summarized from UNFCCC and China Industrial Statistics Yearbook 2006). 
3. Empirical analysis of LHF problems  
    A lthough the LHF problem in  Develop ing countries has received much attention, most studies focus 
on theoretical analysis and policy  implications. No literature so far provides any empirical evidence on 
whether the cheapest abatement measure has be implemented for CDM projects in developing countries.  
3.1. The Model and Data 
The key assumption in this study is the increasing marg inal cost of reducing GHG. Specifically, a  
region with higher emission of GHG per capita enjoys lower marg inal cost of reducing GHG, after 
controlling for variab les such as income, energy consumption and so on. Therefore, if there were LHF 
phenomenon in China, there would be more CDM projects with higher CERs in areas where GHG 
emission are relatively high, ceteris paribus.  
Formally, the empirical model is specified as follows: 
          CERj = β0j + β1j EMSj + γij Xij + εij                                                                                      (1) 
Where CERj is log of Certified Emission Reductions of CDM pro jects in province j; EMSj represents 
GHG emissions in province j;  Xij are control variab les and εij are error terms. The reason why use the logs 
of CER rather than the actual amount is that the distribution of CERs across provinces in not normal. The 
Skewness test of normality leads to a rejection of normality, while the test on logs of CER demonstrates 
that one cannot reject the assumption of normality.  
The CDM pro jects data is availab le on the official website of UNFCCC. However, the provincial level 
data on GHG emission is not available. Therefore, we use the total amount of waste gas emission as 
instrument for GHG emission. This is not a good choice since total amount of waste gas includes not only 
some GHG such CO2 and NOx, but also a large variety of non-GHG gas such as SOx. However, total 
amount of waste gas is the best available proxy. 
The waste gas data is drawn from China Statistics Yearbook 2006 (it has 2005 data). Given the small 
sample size (31 cross-section observations), we keep the regression as simple as possible. The two control 
variables we chose are logs of per capita GDP and logs of Energy Consumption per Unit of GDP 
(measured as ton of SCE, per 10,000 Yuan). So the estimated equation is: 
      CERj = β0j + β1j WGASj + γ1j LGDP1j + γ2jENERGYj + εj                                                (2) 
Where CER is log of Certified Emission Reductions of CDM projects; W GAS is the waste gas; LGDP 
is logs of per capita GDP; ENERGY represents logs of Energy Consumption per Unit of GDP and ε is the 
error term. Both LGDP and ENERGY data are drawn from China Statistics Yearbook 2006. 
3.2. Results 
Table 1 reports the results of estimating the determinants of CDM projects under two approaches. 
Since there are zero values of CERs, we use Tobit Regression. OLS regression results are also provided. 
Both Tobit and OLS equations demonstrate a positive effect of waste gas on amount of CERs, significant 
at 1% level, while the coefficients on logs of GDP are negative and significant. The coefficients of 
ENERGY, however, are not statistically  significant. In  addition, the coefficients of OLS estimation are 
closer to zero than those in Tobit regression, which is expected. 
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The results are in accordance with the assumption that CDM projects are more likely  to be established 
in areas with higher emission of GHG. This can be seen as an indirect evidence of the LHF problem in  
China: The cheapest abatement measures had been implemented for CDM projects in China. 
To interpret the magnitude of the Tobit coefficients, it is useful to calculate the marginal effect of the 
variables. As is shown in Table 2, the marg inal effect (unconditional) of W GAS is 2.55, indicat ing that 
one percent increase in waste gas emission in the province attracts more CDM projects with 2.55% h igher 
amount of CERs. On  the other hand, one percent increase in  GDP per capita make the area less attractive 
to CDM projects, with 1.53% reduction in the amount of GHG.  
Table 1 Tobit and OLS estimates of CERs 
 OLS Tobit  
Variables Coefficients(Standard error) 
WGAS 2.36**   (.49) 2.82**   (.62) 
LGDP -1.53**   (.58) -1.68**   (.59) 
ENERGY -.05 ** (.35) .02**   (.36) 
Constant 11.39*   (5.32) 10.83*   (5.65) 
R square .52 / 
Log likelihood / -53.56 
         * denotes significant at 5% level; **denotes significant at 1% level. 
Table 2 Marginal Effects of Tobit Regression 
 Marginal Effects of Tobit Estimation 
 Unconditional Conditional on being uncensored Probability Uncensored 
WGAS 2.55 2.03 .33 
LGDP -1.53 -1.20 -.20 
ENERGY .014 .011 .002 
Table 3 Tobit and OLS regression after eliminating HFC-23 Projects. 
 OLS Tobit  
Variables Coefficients(Standard error) 
WGAS 2.21**  (.46) 2.60**  (.56) 
LGDP -1.59**  (.55) -1.73**  (.56) 
ENERGY -.04 ** (.34) .09**  (.34) 
Constant 12.30*  (5.02) 11.95*  (5.32) 
 R square .53 / 
Log likelihood / -52.10 
         * denotes significant at 5% level;  **denotes significant at 1% level. 
3.3. Discussion and Additional Tests 
One weakness of the empirical analysis is the small sample size, which make it impossible to include 
enough control variables to the equation. In  addition to GDP per capita and Energy consumption, we also 
need to control for technology, labor supply and other variab les that may affect site  selection of CDM 
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projects. For example, high GHG emission areas may be more advanced area, which has higher 
technology in reducing GHG. Omitting the technology variable would bias the results. 
One may  think of using a panel data and estimate the fixed effect. For example, we can  use a three 
year (from 2005 to 2007) cross-sectional data, therefore increasing the degree of freedom. This approach, 
however, bring in the problem of endogenity: the CDM projects would reduce the GHG gas emission. 
Since Waste Gases includes most GHG, CDM projects would also reduce Waste Gas emission. An 
alternative approach is to use the 2SLS regression.  
Another concern is the HFC-23 decomposition projects, which account for 54% of all CERs. Both 
Tobit and OLS regression after eliminating these 10 projects are reported in Table 3. It is clear that the 
coefficients are very close to those in Table 1. Therefore it is safe to conclude that the conclusion drawn 
from the original regressions are robust.  
4. Conclusion 
This study throughly investigates implementation of CDM in China. The energy consumption and 
GHG emission in China are outlined. The details of the CDM projects, including their distribution in 
China, and the types of projects are summarized. The study focuses on the "Low-hanging Fruit" problem 
of CDM. In order to test whether there were LHF problem in China, a simple empirical model is 
developed. The results indicate that areas with higher emission of GHG and low level of GDP per capita 
attract more CDM pro jects with higher amount of CERs. This can be seen as an indirect evidence of the 
LHF problem. The results are robust after eliminating HFC-23 decomposition projects from the sample. 
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